Nuclear Apartheid and the Right to Decide: Who Governs the Global Nuclear Order? 
In an assertive reaffirmation of Washington&rsquo;s long-standing position, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio last week declared,&nbsp;"A regime like that can never have nuclear weapons."&nbsp;His remarks&mdash;echoing President Donald Trump's repeated vow that&nbsp;"Iran will not be permitted to develop nuclear weapons on my watch"&mdash;reveal the enduring determination of American leadership to act as arbiter of the world&rsquo;s nuclear hierarchy.
Rubio was careful to draw a line between the Iranian people and their government, commending Iran&rsquo;s ancient civilization while condemning its rulers. But behind the diplomatic nuance lies a deeper question&mdash;one that continues to haunt the foundations of global nuclear governance: Who gets to decide which countries can possess the ultimate deterrent?
The Inherited Privilege of the Nuclear Club
The United States, not Iran, built and deployed the first nuclear weapons. It remains the only nation ever to use them in war&mdash;on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945&mdash;ushering in a nuclear age defined by deterrence and the implicit threat of annihilation. Since then, eight other countries have followed the nuclear path: Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel&mdash;the latter maintaining a posture of deliberate ambiguity.
Five of these states are recognized under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as legitimate nuclear powers. The others, including Israel (which has never signed the NPT), developed their arsenals outside the treaty framework. Together, these states possess roughly 12,500 warheads.
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This reality underscores an uncomfortable truth: the current nuclear order is not based on universal legal principles but on historical advantage and geopolitical leverage. The implicit message is clear&mdash;nuclear capability is acceptable if you already have it, and unacceptable if you seek it now.
Iran: A Case Study in Selective Enforcement
The treatment of Iran stands in stark contrast to how other nuclear aspirants have been managed. India and Pakistan faced temporary international backlash after their 1998 tests but were soon reintegrated into the global system. North Korea, despite sanctions and diplomatic condemnation, remains a de facto nuclear state.
Iran, by contrast, has been subject to a labyrinth of sanctions, military threats, and diplomatic isolation&mdash;despite having agreed to verifiable constraints under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which the U.S. itself abandoned in 2018. Since then, Western leaders have continued to cast Iran as a uniquely dangerous proliferator, despite Tehran&rsquo;s continued insistence that its nuclear programme remains peaceful.
The underlying inconsistency reveals that the West&rsquo;s nuclear non-proliferation narrative is often less about universal security and more about geopolitical alignment. In this light, Iran is not punished for breaking the rules, but for daring to challenge the legitimacy of the rules themselves.
The Israeli Exception
No discussion of nuclear equity in the Middle East can ignore Israel&rsquo;s undeclared nuclear arsenal. Though never formally acknowledged, Israel&rsquo;s nuclear capability is widely accepted by intelligence communities and global analysts. Yet it has never faced the scrutiny or condemnation directed at Iran. This double standard reinforces a perception&mdash;especially in the Global South&mdash;of a rules-based order designed and enforced by the powerful, for the powerful.
Israeli leaders frequently invoke &ldquo;all options&rdquo; in reference to Iran, a thinly veiled allusion to nuclear capabilities. For Iran, this creates an existential imbalance&mdash;one that fuels its security calculus. The result is a classic security dilemma: efforts by one state to enhance its security (e.g., Israel&rsquo;s nuclear deterrence) compel others to do the same, breeding perpetual instability.
The Illusion of Sovereign Equality
The core contradiction of the nuclear order lies in its pretense of sovereign equality. The NPT itself enshrines a fundamental inequity: five states are allowed to possess nuclear weapons, while all others are forbidden&mdash;permanently. While Article VI of the treaty commits nuclear states to eventual disarmament, meaningful progress has been glacial at best.
Meanwhile, nations like Iran&mdash;signatories in good standing&mdash;are denied the peaceful use of nuclear technology due to suspicions rooted not in violations, but in geopolitical mistrust. This transforms the NPT from a tool of collective security into an instrument of strategic containment.
Rethinking the Global Nuclear Framework
If the international community is to craft a genuinely credible non-proliferation regime, it must begin by confronting the hypocrisies embedded in the current order.
Three steps are essential:
<ol start="1" type="1">
<li class="MsoNormal">Recommitment to Disarmament:&nbsp;The recognised nuclear powers must take meaningful steps toward reducing their arsenals, in line with Article VI of the NPT. The status quo, where existing powers retain thousands of warheads while blocking others, cannot endure without eroding the treaty&rsquo;s legitimacy.</li>
<li class="MsoNormal">Addressing Regional Security Imbalances:&nbsp;In volatile regions like the Middle East, sustainable peace requires addressing the underlying asymmetries&mdash;especially Israel&rsquo;s undeclared arsenal. A regional nuclear-free zone, though politically difficult, remains the only credible path to long-term stability.</li>
<li class="MsoNormal">Equitable Nuclear Governance:&nbsp;International institutions must evolve beyond the current power-driven model. The future of nuclear regulation cannot rest on the vetoes of a few nations with vested interests. A multilateral framework that includes emerging powers and reflects the changing global order is long overdue.</li>
</ol>
Power, Not Principle, Governs the Nuclear World
When American or Israeli leaders declare that Iran must not possess nuclear weapons, they are not invoking universal norms&mdash;they are asserting the privileges of power. Until the nuclear order is reformed to reflect genuine equity and mutual security, such pronouncements will continue to be viewed across much of the world as ideological posturing rather than principled leadership.
Iran&rsquo;s nuclear aspirations, whether justified or not, are ultimately a mirror held up to an international system that proclaims fairness but practices exclusion. The real question is not whether Iran should have nuclear weapons, but whether any nation has the right to decide for others&mdash;based not on law, but on leverage.
The global nuclear order stands at a crossroads. It can choose to evolve toward a more balanced, principled framework&mdash;or it can continue to enforce a deeply unequal status quo, risking not only its moral authority but global security itself.

Explosion of a nuclear weapon (illustrative image)

Global nuclear rules aren’t about fairness—they’re about who holds power and who’s denied it

Nuclear Apartheid: West's Double Standards on Arms

Global nuclear rules aren’t about fairness—they’re about who holds power and who’s denied it

May 16, 2025 | 16:18 IST