Lakshadweep: India’s New Strategic Frontier in the Indian Ocean

In a move that underscores India’s evolving maritime strategy, New Delhi is set to convert the Lakshadweep archipelago into a full-fledged defence command centre — a development that will complement the existing Andaman and Nicobar Command in the Bay of Bengal. The proposal to hand over Bitra Island to the Ministry of Defence is not merely a bureaucratic reshuffle; it marks a decisive phase in India’s effort to secure its maritime periphery against expanding Chinese influence across the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

The Indian Ocean is fast emerging as the principal theatre of geopolitical competition in the Indo-Pacific. Around 40 per cent of global trade and nearly 80 per cent of maritime oil shipments pass through these waters. From the Strait of Hormuz to the Malacca Strait, this oceanic expanse forms the economic and energy lifeline for Asia’s major economies. In this context, the strategic importance of India’s island territories — Lakshadweep to the west and Andaman and Nicobar to the east — cannot be overstated.

The Western Sentinel: Lakshadweep’s New Role

Lakshadweep’s location — roughly 200 to 440 kilometres off India’s south-western coast — offers an unparalleled vantage point over the Arabian Sea. The archipelago sits astride the vital shipping lanes connecting the Middle East, Africa, and South-East Asia. The Indian government’s decision to acquire Bitra Island and transfer it to defence agencies is part of a broader plan to transform the region into a strategic command zone equipped with tri-service capabilities.

The upcoming facilities at Minicoy and Agatti are expected to include dual-use airfields, naval docks, radar installations, and advanced surveillance systems. Once operational, Lakshadweep could host coordinated air-sea operations, enhancing India’s ability to monitor the Nine Degree Channel — a key maritime artery connecting the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Malacca.

This western command would effectively complete the maritime arc that India has long envisioned — with Andaman and Nicobar guarding the eastern flank and Lakshadweep securing the western seaboard. Together, they would provide a two-pronged mechanism for sea denial and control, projecting Indian power across the breadth of the Indian Ocean.

China’s Expanding Footprint and India’s Response

Beijing’s naval reach has been growing steadily. From its military base in Djibouti to its expanding logistics network in Gwadar, Hambantota, and Kyaukpyu, China’s “string of pearls” strategy seeks to encircle India through a chain of dual-use ports and infrastructure. The Chinese navy’s regular presence in the IOR, including its research and surveillance vessels, has become a matter of concern for Indian defence planners.

Between 2020 and 2024, Chinese research ships — some with covert military links — conducted multiple operations in the region. Their activities, often disguised as scientific missions, have been perceived by Indian analysts as attempts to map undersea topography for potential submarine deployments.

India’s response has been multi-layered. On one hand, it is bolstering maritime partnerships through platforms like the Quad (with the United States, Japan, and Australia) and conducting joint patrols with littoral states such as Indonesia, Thailand, and Mauritius. On the other, it is developing indigenous deterrence through command infrastructure, naval expansion, and enhanced surveillance.

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Learning from the East: The Andaman Model

The Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC), India’s only tri-service theatre command, has become the template for what India intends to replicate in Lakshadweep. Established in 2001, the ANC integrates the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard, allowing for seamless joint operations. It has significantly strengthened India’s presence at the eastern entrance to the Indian Ocean, near the Strait of Malacca — a vital chokepoint for Chinese maritime trade.

Over the past decade, India has invested heavily in upgrading Andaman’s infrastructure, extending runways, deploying P-8I maritime patrol aircraft, and stationing warships capable of anti-submarine and amphibious operations. The islands also serve as a launch point for cooperative security exercises such as Maitree with Thailand and Samudra Shakti with Indonesia, reinforcing India’s role as a regional security provider.

Now, with Lakshadweep being prepared as the western counterpart, India is effectively establishing a maritime pincer across the Indo-Pacific. If the ANC represents the forward post of India’s “Act East” strategy, Lakshadweep will be the cornerstone of its “Secure West” doctrine.

Strategic and Economic Convergence

The decision to militarise Lakshadweep is not purely defensive. It carries significant economic and geopolitical implications. The Arabian Sea is a crucial route for India’s energy imports and trade with Africa and the Gulf region. Securing these lanes safeguards India’s economic interests, especially at a time when global disruptions — from the Red Sea crisis to the Suez Canal blockages — have exposed the fragility of maritime logistics.

Lakshadweep’s transformation could also generate civilian benefits, much like Andaman’s developmental model. Dual-use infrastructure such as upgraded runways, docks, and communication systems could support both military and civilian operations, boosting tourism, fisheries, and inter-island connectivity.

Moreover, by asserting administrative and military control over remote islands like Bitra and Minicoy, India is reinforcing its claim over a substantial Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This not only allows for better resource management but also prevents encroachment by foreign vessels, especially in an era of increasing competition for undersea minerals and hydrocarbons.

A Maritime Doctrine for the Indo-Pacific Era

India’s maritime strategy rests on two operational pillars: sea control and sea denial. Sea control aims to dominate key maritime spaces, while sea denial focuses on denying adversaries freedom of action. The integration of Lakshadweep and Andaman within a unified operational network would allow India to employ both strategies depending on the situation.

For instance, in times of heightened tension, Indian naval and air assets based in Lakshadweep could effectively monitor or even block maritime traffic heading toward the Arabian Sea. Similarly, Andaman-based forces could control access to the Malacca Strait, creating a formidable deterrent against adversarial manoeuvres.

The Indian Navy’s modernisation plan — with 59 warships under construction and another 31 on the drawing board — reflects the intent to support such doctrines. The forthcoming indigenous aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, and long-range maritime patrol systems will further integrate with island-based commands for real-time, network-centric operations.

Securing the Western Flank: Challenges Ahead

While the Lakshadweep plan is strategically sound, it is not without challenges. The fragile ecosystem of the islands demands an environmentally sensitive approach. Infrastructure development must balance defence imperatives with ecological preservation and local community interests.

Moreover, logistics and connectivity remain complex due to the islands’ distance from the mainland. Sustaining a tri-service command there will require consistent resource allocation, improved sea-air connectivity, and modern base-support systems.

Diplomatically, India will also need to manage perceptions among neighbouring countries. The militarisation of the islands could be viewed with caution by smaller littoral states, especially those influenced by China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Transparent communication and cooperative engagement will be essential to maintain regional goodwill.

The Two Anchors of Indian Maritime Power

Lakshadweep and Andaman together represent the twin anchors of India’s maritime vision — one facing the Arabian Sea and the Gulf, the other the Bay of Bengal and the Pacific. In an age when the Indo-Pacific has become the world’s strategic centre of gravity, India’s ability to project power, secure sea lanes, and respond to regional crises will depend on how effectively it operationalises these island chains.

As China’s presence deepens across the Indian Ocean, from Djibouti to Hambantota, India’s counterbalance lies not in confrontation but in preparedness — through enhanced capability, infrastructure, and partnerships. Lakshadweep’s transformation into a western command centre is thus not merely a defence project; it is a declaration of intent.

For New Delhi, the message is clear: the Indian Ocean must remain truly Indian in its strategic balance.